The Zvizdets Mangustu [Mongoose (operation) is fucked up] Telegram channel: This would not be possible if the enemy exercised firm control over the territory south of Rai-Oleksandrivka. It is likely that the small Russian infantry groups still detected in Rai-Oleksandrivka and Yurkivka are simply unable, for a number of reasons, to effectively exert fire control over the surrounding terrain. Moreover, the AFU have evidently launched a series of tactical counterattacks over the past few days in the Orikhuvatka–Rai-Oleksandrivka direction. While this did not result in significant Ukrainian advances toward Rai-Oleksandrivka, it clearly succeeded in pushing Russian infantry groups back from the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal to the western outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka—specifically along the stretch from Pump Station No. 2 [48.817521, 37.765936] to the area south of Orikhuvatka. Furthermore, given that the AFU continue to hold a number of positions north and south of Rai-Oleksandrivka, the overall activity of the forward Russian units—which their command had directed toward Mykolaivka and the Sloviansk Thermal Power Plant—has clearly diminished. – Fierce fighting is also ongoing south of the E-40 highway, where the AFU have evidently launched counterattacks along the Pershomarivka–Malynivka and Vasiutynske–Tykhonivka directions. Although the number of Russian assault infantry deployed along these directions—west of the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal (along the Malynivka–Tykhonivka line)—remains substantial, their rate of advance toward the eastern outskirts of Kramatorsk, and particularly toward the local airfield [48.704833, 37.628397], has evidently slowed significantly (if not ground to a complete halt). For at least the past week and a half, the enemy has been unable to make any real progress in this area toward Vasiutynske, Pershomarivka, or Vasylivska Pustosh. The only sector on the far left flank of the 3rd CAA where the enemy managed to advance 1.5–2 km is the tactical axis running from Markove toward the Kreidiani Bilokuzmynivski Skeli [Bilokuzmynivka Chalk Cliffs, 48.660122, 37.685396]. However, Russian assault troops never actually reached the cliffs themselves and were halted northeast of Fedorivka. 2️⃣ At first glance, the situation in the Sloviansk direction (and partly in the Kramatorsk direction)—driven by the offensive of the Russian 3rd CAA—appears, to put it mildly, difficult for the AFU. The forward assault groups of this army are already positioned an average of 10–12 km from Sloviansk and are actively attempting to capture Mykolaivka and reach the Sloviansk TPP (while being even closer to Kramatorsk—within 9–10 km). In reality, however, the Russian 3rd CAA has so far been unable to accomplish its primary objective within the broader Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation: advancing the main forces of its forward units directly to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Moreover, the longer and more persistently it attempts to do so, the more it loses any prospect of ultimately succeeding. One reason for this state of affairs is the situation in the Lyman direction. Effectively, the plan to secure the northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration—which entailed completely eliminating the Ukrainian bridgehead at Lyman within the operational zones of the Russian 20th and 25th CAAs (part of the GT "West")—has been thwarted. It should be noted, however, that this factor influences the Russian 3rd CAA's ability to continue advancing toward Sloviansk only indirectly, as its offensive axis is separated from that of the 25th CAA by the Siverskyi Donets River. Moreover, while only the Russian 20th CAA is currently withdrawing from Lyman, the 25th CAA—which is directly oriented toward Lyman and shares a flank with the 3rd CAA—is effectively continuing to hold previously captured lines. This includes the area serving as a sort of "staging ground" for an assault on Lyman: the extensive forest massif between Yampil and Lyman. 🇺🇦Subscribe to the channel