The Zvizdets Mangustu [Mongoose (operation) is fucked up] Telegram channel: Undoubtedly, there is another, more significant factor contributing to the POTENTIAL difficulties facing the Russian 3rd CAA. The AFU are currently successfully holding the Mykolaivka–Orikhuvatka line and the territory of the Sloviansk TPP—a key area, or perhaps even a "linchpin," for the defense of Sloviansk from the east—though, naturally, this is not without its challenges. The same applies to the Vasylivska Pustosh–Zapovidne (Nykanorivka)–Vasiutynske–Pershomarivka and Semenivka–Bilokuzmynivka–Viroliubivka–Kurtivka areas relative to Kramatorsk; all these positions continue to be successfully held and defended by Ukrainian troops. However, if these two factors continue to coincide for any significant length of time, the command of the Russian 3rd CAA may well face a situation where the prospect of breaking through to the immediate approaches of Sloviansk from the east and southeast is overshadowed by an urgent need to hold positions along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River. The prospect of elements of the 3rd CAA continuing offensive operations against Kramatorsk from the east may become even more illusory. If the 25th CAA follows the Russian 20th CAA in retreating across the (Chornyi) Zherebets River—a highly likely scenario, given that Ukrainian units are evidently ALREADY operating in the Yampil area—then the Russian 3rd CAA will be FORCED to deploy substantial forces and assets facing north (to hold the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets, at least along the stretch from Kryva Luka to Dronivka, a distance of about 11 km as the crow flies). Moreover, this will clearly happen regardless of whether the 3rd CAA’s command desires it or not. They will simply be compelled to do so to reliably secure their right (northern) flank against Ukrainian counterattacks. Given the winding course of the Siverskyi Donets River in this sector, the command of the Russian 3rd CAA would evidently need to deploy at least one full-strength brigade—if not two—in this area. This, in turn, is bound to affect its ability to press forward relentlessly from the east toward the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration itself. At the very least, it would be forced to commit the majority (or nearly all) of its operational reserves—even before achieving a breakthrough to the immediate approaches of the urban area. Especially considering that at least one of the 3rd CAA’s brigades (namely, the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) is currently "preoccupied" in the Kostiantynivka direction. Of course, they could also ask their "superiors" (the command of the GT "South" and their own General Staff) to toss them "something" from their own reserve stockpiles—which are already clearly quite depleted. But in that scenario, Russian "commanders" would have to ADDITIONALLY conjure that "something" for the 3rd CAA out of thin air—pulling it from somewhere like a rabbit out of a hat. Yet, they are hardly magicians... Dear readers! If you like my texts, then you can express your own affection for them, at a difficult moment for the author, not only by liking, but also financially... For which I will be sincerely grateful. I emphasize once again... THIS IS ONLY ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, I do not force anyone to do this... 4441 1111 3454 1972 or 4731 2196 5536 5421 PayPal: kastet771@gmail.com 🇺🇦Subscribe to the channel