The Serhii FLASH | Pro tekhnolohiyi [About technology] Telegram channel: People are asking questions about my previous post. Almost two years ago, the enemy began using MESH radio modems to communicate with strike and reconnaissance UAVs operating within our territory. A specialized group of [UAV] pilots was even formed to carry out this project. A MESH modem is essentially the same as a standard radio modem, with the added capability of creating redundant channels and relaying information. In this setup, every radio modem simultaneously acts as a signal repeater for other similar modems. In the beginning, the configuration for the Shahed [Geran] drones was quite rudimentary: a single frequency band, one set of modem settings, one password, and a single encryption key for the communication channel. Let me take a brief digression here: consider that the communication parameters are configured by specialists from Alabuga [Special Economic Zone, a major industrial and manufacturing hub located in the Republic of Tatarstan, Russia]. We are talking about a serious matter—strike UAVs. And do you know what they call the individual units within their modem system? "Pisya" [a crude, childish term for genitals]! A year ago, when I saw that the password to access the menu of each modem was "Pizda" [a vulgar term for a vagina], I thought that was the limit. But then I discovered that the communication encryption key was "Khyi" [a vulgar term for a penis]. At the time, I just thought: "What kind of sick people are you?" I can hardly imagine a Ukrainian developer coming up with such words for a password. But back to the topic. The enemy perceived no threat, as everything was functioning without a hitch. For nearly a year, at the national level, we effectively failed to engage in any active or systematic countermeasures against this communication system. It was only when jet-powered "Shaheds" began attacking the capital that we were finally compelled to take action. When we began jamming modems operating in the 1300–1500 MHz band, they switched the "Shaheds" to a different band: 3200–3400 MHz. Let me make a brief digression here. Imagine a country that has mobilized its top engineers to develop combat UAVs. Tens of thousands of specialists work at Alabuga—designers, scientists, engineers, and gifted students. Naturally, among these thousands, there are experts focused on radio communications—and I am certain they are highly skilled. So, as we began to disrupt the enemy’s mesh network communications, they responded with a series of new challenges and solutions. They are testing various communication options—in a wide array of combinations—practically every single day. It is an invisible war, and, for the moment, we are lagging slightly behind. I am not ashamed to admit this, because we are not facing Russia alone. The Russian industrial sector proved unable to handle the production of these mesh modems; consequently, we are up against not just Russia, but also China’s best engineers, who are developing the technical solutions and algorithms for these modems. What are the Russians doing now? The same things that I—or any engineer—would do: using different frequency ranges and bands, separating reception and transmission, carrying multiple modems on board, employing antenna systems with beamforming, utilizing ground-based repeaters, varying network configurations, operating modems sequentially or on a time-division basis, using decoy frequencies, performing handovers between different ground stations, and increasing power output. All of this is aimed at a single goal: to maintain the communication link between the Shahed drones and their operator. As for us, we must rise to these challenges and contend with the engineers from two different countries. That is our path.
Развитие технологий связи и средств радиоэлектронной борьбы для FPV-дронов
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