The Filolog v zasade [Philologist in ambush] Telegram channel: Three months ago, I prepared a brief memorandum to accompany a collection of information regarding short-range air defense (SHORAD). This material included excerpts from various public sources as well as non-public data. I am providing that memorandum below (with certain omissions). SHORAD assets currently operate as a collection of disparate elements—poorly coordinated with one another and, in many cases, not integrated into a unified operational framework at all. There is no cohesive, structured, or echeloned system in place. Interagency and interregional coordination is weak. Furthermore, coordination between different units—even within the same organization—remains underdeveloped. There is no unified digital system for the collection, processing, analysis, and transmission of data—such as tracking aerial incursions, allocating targets, designating targets, or analyzing and predicting flight paths. In practice, coordination is largely based on informal, horizontal connections. Situational awareness is frequently maintained through specialized Telegram chats (provided there is internet access). There is no systematic development of a comprehensive suite of detection and tracking assets. This includes acoustic and optical sensors, signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities—such as those targeting MESH modems, SineLink, and CDET channels—as well as systems for detecting Starlink terminals and aerial reconnaissance drones. Radar systems remain the primary means of detection and tracking; however, they are prone to missing targets that move through "blind spots" in the low-altitude tier (such as those following low-lying terrain or riverbeds). A critical challenge lies in integrating long-range detection loops with long-range engagement capabilities. The organization of low-altitude air defense is effectively characterized by a form of "feudal fragmentation" (a situation exacerbated by the limited number of available SAM [surface-to-air missile] and SPAAGM [gun-missile] systems, as well as their constrained ammunition supplies. In particular, the frameworks for long-range detection and engagement over maritime areas—specifically in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Caspian theaters—as well as along river corridors, have not been adequately established. Examples include the attacks in August on Gelendzhik, Nizhnekamsk, Novorossiysk, and Ust-Luga, in addition to the regular raids on Crimea originating from the sea. A layered defense system appears to be in place primarily for the capital region (following the drone raids on Moscow on June 16–18). I would also like to highlight the critical issue of accurately identifying aerial targets; this is essential for optimizing the distribution of targets among the various engagement assets within the low-altitude air defense network. Continued below ⬇️ Telegram Филолог в засаде Три месяца назад я подготовил краткую сопроводительную записку к информационным подборкам по проблематике малой ПВО, которые включали выдержки из ряда публичных источников и непубличные сведения. Ниже размещаю указанную записку (за некоторыми умолчаниями).…
Проблемы комплектования, оснащения и координации подразделений малой ПВО и огневых групп
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