The Filolog v zasade [Philologist in ambush] Telegram channel: With regard to MFGs [mobile fire groups] and AOPs [air observation posts] (which combine both detection and engagement functions) the effectiveness of their operations is clearly hindered by issues related to staffing, training (and supplementary training), and equipment.). Staffing, initial/supplementary training, and equipment issues clearly have a negative impact on the effectiveness of MFGs and AOPs. Recruiting volunteers for regional SHORAD units is challenging, partly due to concerns that signing a contract with the MoD could lead to personnel being deployed for purposes other than those originally intended. Within agency-affiliated units, staffing small-scale air defense groups—often mandated by directive—is complicated by overall personnel shortages, as well as concerns regarding the quality of personnel in terms of both marksmanship and physical fitness. Training personnel to engage aerial targets requires a specialized approach, including the creation of appropriate target environments at training ranges. Overall, the level of marksmanship training—as well as the initial or supplementary training—provided to personnel within departmental units and regional volunteer detachments leaves much to be desired. Inadequate marksmanship skills directly diminish the effectiveness of target engagement. Furthermore, they lead to collateral damage—a consequence of both a disregard for safety protocols when firing in populated areas and the unskilled use of specialized weaponry (as seen, for instance, in the incidents in Kapotnya on June 16 and the Voronezh region on July 2). Moreover, such incidents also stem from poor fire control organization and weak interagency coordination; the problem, therefore, extends beyond the insufficient training level of the personnel themselves. The inadequate marksmanship proficiency of personnel also limits the self-defense capabilities of these groups when operating in operational-tactical or operational zones—particularly during attacks by medium-range strike drones or small, kamikaze drones deployed from "mothership" UAVs or aerostats. Furthermore, instances of panic have been observed during attacks by "Hornet"-type drones equipped with automatic target acquisition. The ability to engage targets—whether while repelling raids or during self-defense (especially at night)—is also hindered by the inadequate technical equipment provided to these units. Deploying units in "fire ambushes" without sufficient situational awareness or intelligence support often results in long periods of passive waiting for unpredictable drone incursions, leading to a waste of time and the misallocation of resources. Due to poor situational awareness, escort units are frequently unable to respond in a timely manner to sudden, emerging threats. Additionally, internet blackouts and mobile network outages—which often occur during drone raids or overflights—further degrade situational awareness and the coordination of defensive actions. Regarding the overall effectiveness of these units as of early July, Dmitry Rogozin noted: "...the number of UAVs shot down specifically by MFGs has risen over the past year from 10% to 13% of the total number of intercepted enemy drones—a trend particularly evident in frontline regions." A key nuance here is that this increase in the interception rate has occurred against a backdrop of a significant surge in the number of drones deployed by the enemy, alongside a simultaneous expansion in the number of mobile fire groups (including escort units) operating in the Special Military Operation zone and Crimea—an expansion that is clearly disproportionate to the modest 3% increase in successful interceptions. Given the enemy’s growing use of high-speed, jet-powered drones, it is unlikely that the effectiveness of these mobile fire groups will see any significant improvement in their current state (the attack on Novorossiysk on August 12 serves as a clear example). Continued below ⬇️ Telegram Филолог в засаде Применительно непосредственно к МОГам и ПВНам (которые совмещают функционал обнаружения и поражения). Негативное влияние на степень эффективности действий МОГов и ПВНов определённо имеют проблемы комплектования, (до)обучения и оснащения. Есть сложности…
Проблемы комплектования, оснащения и координации подразделений малой ПВО и огневых групп
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