Проблемы организации и эффективности малых групп противовоздушной обороны

Sitrep_links_in_eng@sitrep_links_in_engАрмия и СВО15 ноября 2026, 20:31

The Filolog v zasade [Philologist in ambush] Telegram channel: Regarding MFGs and AOPs, I would also like to highlight two conceptual problems. First, the explosive growth in the number of these small-scale air defense groups—in their current configuration—appears to be little more than a performative exercise designed to create the appearance of intense activity. Relying solely on vehicle-mounted machine-gun crews is woefully inadequate for meeting the demands of the current operational environment, let alone future challenges. Notably, this issue was identified in [document title and authoring group] (June revision): "Within the armed forces and other security agencies that deploy MFGs, there is a prevailing view that simply stationing a vehicle equipped with a machine gun in a given sector is sufficient—and, indeed, such groups do occasionally manage to shoot down enemy UAVs." On a positive note, the [document] advocates for the development of mobile strike groups equipped with interceptor drones. However, the proposed implementation raises questions. Furthermore, it appears that this problem has been recognized at the level of the senior military-political leadership. For instance, during a meeting with military correspondents on June 29, 2026, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov announced the creation of MFGs armed with interceptor drones, the integration of radar stations into a unified detection network, and the incorporation of AI algorithms into the air-defense system—with a target date of November (though, regarding detection assets, the discussion focused exclusively on radar). Meanwhile, as of at least the end of July, there had been no significant progress in expanding the "small-scale" drone-based air-defense component. Second, a vast amount of effort and resources—both in the operational-strategic and strategic depths—is being concentrated on point defense (the protection of specific facilities), which should, in reality, serve only as a final line of defense for worst-case scenarios. Consequently, the principle of echeloning short-range air defense is being ignored (setting up "fire ambushes" in the absence of stable, reliable intelligence regarding the flight corridors and approach vectors of enemy UAVs cannot be considered a form of echeloning). As a result, first, when point-defense assets are overwhelmed, enemy drones reach their targets. Second, intercepting drones as they approach or arrive directly over a target—without neutralizing their warheads in mid-air—often leads to the drones detonating upon impact within the protected site or in residential areas, frequently causing significant material damage and loss of life. There has been no visible progress toward establishing a proper, echeloned air defense system. Yet, the challenge of echeloning could be largely addressed through the use of mobile strike groups equipped with airborne intercept assets. These offer far greater flexibility, responsiveness, and operational reach compared to fire teams, which are constrained by the effective range of their small-arms or light-weapon systems. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that, when accounting for total costs, aerial interception is significantly more economical. However, the deployment of airborne intercept assets—beyond the issue of scaling—faces several specific challenges. First, there is a current prohibition on the use of explosive warheads in rear-echelon regions. Meanwhile, the kinetic impact of small interceptors is often insufficient to bring down heavy drones; even when a drone is successfully struck, the impact may fail to trigger an in-air detonation, leaving the threat of an explosion upon impact on the ground. Second, there are regulatory hurdles regarding the installation of signal repeaters on cellular towers—a measure that would be essential for ensuring broad coverage zones and, consequently, extending the operational reach of interceptors.

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Sitrep_links_in_eng@sitrep_links_in_engАрмия и СВОвчера
Проблемы организации и эффективности малых групп противовоздушной обороны

Thirdly, as long as the current "patchwork" organizational structure of short-range air defense persists, it is highly unlikely that interceptor drones and other high-tech assets can be utilized with maximum effectiveness. [I'm omitting the final section, as it contains sensitive, specific details.] As you can see, this note is general in nature (specific details were covered in the aforementioned briefings), and some points were not addressed at all. Nevertheless, the core issues have been ou...