In our tactical approach, the areas of responsibility required to ensure execution were divided as follows: Vladimir Novikov's focus was on personnel management, training troops to operate in small groups, infiltration tactics, and isolating the battlefield through infiltration. My contribution involved amassing drones to support these tactics, devising EW corridors, implementing signals intelligence, and integrating other such assets. I also explored the application of civilian-grade electronics against AFU units. We were already refining these methods back in 2023–2024. The Azov* unit is secondary here; they haven’t introduced anything new. They simply scaled up our concepts and updated the hardware used to execute them. As for why the 20th Army failed to respond—well, that’s not a question for me. Period. Essentially, the enemy took an entire corps—effectively a combined-arms army—and implemented the concepts we developed in a document originally prepared for the Main Directorate for Combat Training. (https://t.me/filatovcorr/5941 — I should note that this manual contains entire paragraphs written in my own rather unpolished style.) That document was leaked (not by me), and the enemy studied it. And there you have it: a combined-arms army—in this case, Azov’s* 3rd Corps—is executing the very tactics that Bely and I conceived and began implementing back in 2023–2024. Once again, those "Azov bastards" failed to surprise me in the slightest; they only proved that my assessments were correct. That is why I dare say that, given the proper authority, I could easily plan a breakthrough of the frontline using armored columns. The Russian Army already possesses all the necessary components and technologies to carry this out. There is no overarching grand strategy; instead, there is a military bureaucracy incapable of assembling the pieces of the puzzle into a coherent picture—a picture that would enable maneuver warfare using armored vehicles. To reiterate: all the necessary technology exists. There is no such thing as a "wall of drones"—that exists only in the minds of fools. And here is another important point. The Azov* [the 3rd AC], once again, proves the validity of my assertions. The fact is that drone-based forces cannot truly alter the situation on the battlefield—precisely because they do not control the line of combat contact. They have no assigned sector of the front, they lack an understanding of the extent of territorial control, they do not know the locations of the army’s infantry units, and, consequently, there is no clear coordination. And when there is no clear coordination—well, you get enemy infiltration in all its glory, a prime example of our tactics in full effect. Telegram Репортер Filatov Друзья, если вы отсмотрели вчерашний ролик канадского (не американского, ошибся) блогера, то вы могли увидеть в конце прикольную ремарку автора по поводу того, что Лиман уже не так уж и важен, и возможно, что российское командование заманило в ловушку третий…