Вероятность новой мобилизации и отсутствие риска социального взрыва в обществе

Sitrep_links_in_eng@sitrep_links_in_engАрмия и СВО8 ноября 2026, 18:46

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This raises the question of opportunity cost. What results could these formations have achieved under different circumstances? How much of their offensive potential was squandered? And, most importantly, what operational outcome was gained in return? Even assuming the enemy suffered significantly heavier losses, that does not necessarily constitute a favorable exchange for us. Attriting the enemy only makes sense if it shifts the balance of combat potential in our favor and creates conditions for further operations in other sectors. Instead, we essentially reenacted the Wehrmacht’s "Operation Citadel"—battering our forces against the enemy in Robotyne and Krynky—while the enemy, once our offensive had run its course, used their reserves to break through our defenses in the Donbas. The notion that one can engage the enemy within a 10-by-10-kilometer square and simply grind them down is as old as warfare itself. Yet, the mere attrition of personnel guarantees no operational outcome whatsoever. Especially when the adversary is capable of replacing losses more quickly, while we expend resources that are far harder to replenish. War demands that we study the experience of previous generations—not for the sake of historical analogies or eloquent quotes, but to avoid doing moronic, bullshit things, and to ensure we don’t drive nails using the faces of our own subordinates. Telegram Mannerheims son Оперативний результат ЗСУ зазнали дуже великих втрат, але треба запитати: чи воно того вартувало? Так, воно того вартувало. Тому що противник "стер" п’ять дивізій об чотири бригади морської піхоти. У нас були втрати, але й у противника були величезні втрати».…