The Reporter Filatov Telegram channel: by pro-Russian war correspondent Andrey Filatov Friends, if you watched yesterday’s video by a Canadian (not American—my mistake) vlogger [Alexandre Robert aka HistoryLegends], you might have caught a curious remark at the end: the author suggests that Lyman is no longer all that important, and that the Russian command may have lured the Azov* (extremist/terrorist) 3rd Corps [in 2023 the Azov Specops Regiment became the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, which in turn became the foundation for the 3rd Army Corps in 2025] into a trap—all to focus their efforts elsewhere. In short, we’ve supposedly showed our genius once again. What can I say? Well, it’s an interesting point. In fact, I often hear this same narrative from some very prominent and respectable people. The argument goes that a reporter like Filatov, being on the ground in a specific sector of the front, can’t possibly see the "big picture"—a perspective supposedly reserved only for the strategic minds at the General Staff level. To these very good friends of mine, I offer this response: Look, I truly regret never learning to play chess. Even now, when I’d like to learn, I only have enough time to reach a level where I can play on my smartphone—with the computer prompting me on where to move my pieces. In short, I simply don’t have the time to systematically study chess strategy and tactics. Yet, I always claim that I could beat any grandmaster in a heartbeat. Naturally, people look at me with surprise. I then add: "That is, provided I have a thousand pawns." Imagine a chessboard set up for a game, but with a thousand extra pawns sitting right next to the board—pawns that I can bring into play whenever I choose, exactly when I need them. In exactly this same way—without demonstrating any particular martial artistry, but rather by maneuvering resources—our command operates (at least, in my humble and worthless opinion). And when it comes to explaining away their screw-ups after the fact by claiming they were all part of some "grand strategic design"—well, they are simply magnificent at that. Hats off to them. As for the tactics being analyzed here: part of the video serves merely as an evidentiary basis, compiled using OSINT. Look, if some blogger—or even a community of OSINT bloggers—can put this together, then the idea that our military censorship is successfully creating any kind of "fog of war" to hinder enemy reconnaissance is just so incredibly naive that it’s not even worth discussing. However, we can discuss the specific tactical methods highlighted here. The question is: what exactly is shown here that you haven’t already seen in my own reports? The answer: all of this was already being put into practice by Commander Vladimir Novikov [callsign "Bely," an assault unit commander of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade, publicly defended by Filatov following his arrest in 2024] and reporter Filatov. We were using EW corridors back in 2023, and by 2024, we had implemented "EW domes," moving electronic warfare assets up right behind our assault units. These tactics were documented and observed in the heat of actual combat by special forces brigade commanders and the "ikhtamnets" [a neologism for a RuAF soldier or mercenary group whose deployment abroad is either denied or not officially acknowledged by the Russian government] who were with us at the "Topol" command post. Pushylin [Head of the so-called DPR] observed it during live combat—as did his deputies, while the "pigs" [Ukrainian forces] were being wiped out. Back then, I said: give us 100 battalions operating according to these tactics, and we could break through any frontline in no time (an important clarification: this refers to the situation as of 2024).
Мнение канадского блогера о потере важности Лимана и возможной ловушке для подразделений Азова
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