The Mannerheims son Telegram channel: Operational outcome "The AFU suffered very heavy losses, but one must ask: was it worth it? Yes, it was worth it. Because the enemy 'wiped out' five divisions against four Marine brigades. We sustained losses, but the enemy also suffered enormous losses." — Alim Kerimov, Chief of Staff of the 34th Separate Marine Brigade of the AFU, in an interview with Radio Liberty. I know nothing about the 34th Marine Brigade, so let us evaluate solely what was stated. Was the "wiping out" of five divisions the operational objective of the Krynky operation? Clearly not. Even publicly available information indicates that the initial objective of the General Command in this sector was far more ambitious. Inflicting heavy losses on the enemy can be an outcome of an operation, but that does not equate to achieving its original objective. A positive side effect cannot automatically justify either the initial concept or the continued execution of the operation. Was the "wiping out" of these divisions actually a "wiping out" in the true sense of the term? The destruction of enemy formations is a perfectly valid operational objective. However, the destruction of a formation is not the same as the elimination of a specific number of infantrymen. It refers to the destruction of combat potential: the dismantling of command-and-control systems, the loss of trained commanders, [UAV] pilots, weapons crews, specialists, and military hardware, as well as the infantry itself. Grinding down infantry—whose numbers the enemy can relatively quickly replenish by bringing in new contract soldiers—is a highly questionable achievement. While replacing personnel is certainly not the same as restoring combat effectiveness, the enemy does not place much value on its infantry, nor does it invest significant resources in their training. Consequently, the loss of rank-and-file infantry and the loss of a unit’s critical capabilities carry vastly different operational value. Destroying a division as an organized combat force entails more than just inflicting heavy casualties; it requires shattering its ability to execute missions. Historically, this has been achieved primarily through operational-tactical maneuvers, deep strikes, envelopments, and encirclements. Modern weaponry allows for a similar effect to be achieved even without physical encirclement, yet the fundamental principle remains unchanged: one must destroy the combat system itself, rather than merely its most easily replaceable component. In the current Russo-Ukrainian War, the total destruction of large formations is the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, claims regarding five "wiped out" divisions require a far more rigorous justification than a simple casualty ratio. For instance, specific units—including battalion commanders, [UAV] pilots, and other key specialists—were effectively destroyed during the Air Assault Forces' offensive in the south and the "Vivaldi" operation conducted by the Third Corps. It is the specific nature of the losses inflicted, rather than merely their quantity, that determines the operational significance of such an outcome. Are the losses on our side justified? Prior to the Krynky operation, the Marines had conducted successful offensive actions in the Velyka Novosilka area, demonstrating superiority over a significant portion of the newly formed, poorly trained units that Zaluzhnyi had hastily assembled at the time. At that stage, the specialized assault troops, the 3rd Corps, and the "Azov" Corps did not yet exist. We had the Air Assault Forces, the Marines, and a few competent, long-established brigades. In other words, the operation in Krynky consumed not merely "personnel," but a finite resource: well-trained formations capable of executing offensive and counter-offensive operations.
Сводка Министерства обороны РФ о ходе специальной военной операции на 8 ноября 2026 года
- 69
- 40
- 14
- 9
- 1
- 1
- 55
- 39
- 15
- 9
- 1